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THE MARKET OF TRADABLE EMISSION RIGHTS 
AND POSSIBILITIES OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
IN POLAND
1. The significance of the market
of tradable emission rights
The system of direct regulation, which has been functioning in the 
United States, came in for severe criticism at the beginning of the seven- 
ties. The primary objection raised regards the negative aspect of its high 
costs of implementation. The most radical criticism of direct methods of 
regulation of the state of environment, however, derives from the con- 
cepts which postulate extending private property rights over environ- 
mental sources and creating, by the state, a specific “market of emission 
rights”. The latter should function according to principles similar to the 
ones operating in every private market. The concept of the market under 
consideration is based on the following three fundamental premises: 
1. The system of private (individual) property rights ought to also extend 
over the environmental commodities and resources. This is the basie 
condition of removing or limiting the rangę of occurrence of external 
ecological damage in the sphere of economic utilization and/or pollu- 
tion of the environment.
2. Similarly, as in the case of other commodities and production factors, 
in the market of tradable emission rights the principle that prices
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reflect the scarcity of a certain economic good (resource) must be 
taken into account. In this case, it means that the relatively rarer the 
‘pure’ environmental resources are, the morę expensive to a given eco­
nomic subject the purchase of the right to burden the environment 
with the emission of harmful pollutants or waste should be.
3. Protection of the environment must not carried out by any means, or 
in an ineffective way, that is so to say at the lowest possible social 
cost, realized at the cost or against the market. On the contrary, its 
realization should be implemented through and thanks to the market. 
The market of pollutants and protection of the environment ought to 
be embedded - by introducing institutional alterations initiated by the 
State - into the system of market economy.
Rights of emission are a production factor just like Capital installa- 
tions or labor force. Not possessing such rights may mean a complete in- 
ability to function for a given manufacturer. Whoever cedes their rights 
of emission must decrease, at their own expense, the amount of emitted 
pollutants or waste.
The market of emission rights can - if it is properly designed - lead to 
a radical drop in the costs borne by society for protection of the environ- 
ment. There is a radical decrease in costs borne on Information and transac- 
tion, which otherwise are so high in the system of obligatory and unified 
technological standards. In an “ecological market economy”, tradable rights 
of emission could be madę good use of in places where they are cheaper 
than pollution treatment installations that would be required otherwise.
A variety of forms of markets of tradable emission rights exist The 
term fuli market means that:
- Permits include the fuli rangę of legally allowed (keeping within 
boundaries determined by emission standards or by the best available 
technologies - BAT or BATNEEC) levels of emission of pollution by 
economic subjects;
- Permits are fully tradable between the participating subjects on the 
market of emission rights.
The limited (incomplete) market means — by analogy - that both the 
subject of permits and rangę of their trading remain limited up to the 
sizes corresponding to the reduction of emission below the level allowed 
by law (in the manner mentioned above).
Area and sector market
Area market means that trading in the tradable emission rights takes 
place within boundaries of regions determined on the basis of particular 
climatic, topographic, economic (and other) criteria, where the ąuality of
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selected environment components such as: air, water and renewable re- 
sources, is controlled. Thus, an inter-regional exchange of a specific pol- 
lutant, for which a given system of tradable rights is designed, is not 
possible.
Sector market means that trading in the tradable rights of emission of 
a determined pollutant takes place on the scalę of the whole branch or 
section, or another selected part of industry of a given country. The sec­
tor market is based on the generał assumption that localization of emis­
sion is not significant from the point of view of a given goal of ecological 
policy in the scope of maintenance and/or improvement of the quality of 
the environment. Therefore, there is no need to limit the regional rangę 
of trading within the market of tradable rights. A classic example here is 
offered by the market of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions by systemie 
thermal power plants, due to an extremely large area of impact of pollu- 
tion by SO2 or other gases emitted. Similarly, the market for emissions 
(application) of tetraethyl lead by refineries, which process lead petrol 
(the latter market was successfully realized in the USA at the turn of 
the seventies and eighties, allowing the refinery industry to considerably 
lower the costs of a switch from lead to lead-free petrol) is an example of 
a sector market.
2. USA’s and Europe’s experience in implementing 
markets of tradable emission rights
As far as the implementation of a system of tradable emission rights 
is concerned, it seems that the American experience is the most signifi­
cant. The possibility of sectoral trading in the tradable permits for SO2 
and NOX emissions was introduced in November 1990 by the power of 
the Act on Air Protection (Clean Air Act Amendments). This system was 
an element of the program to limit acid emissions. The aims of the pro­
gram were the following:
1. Limiting the negative impact of acid emissions through the reduction 
of the annual emissions of SO2 by 10 million tons, as well as of emis­
sions of NOX by two million tons in comparison with 1980;
2. reaching this level of reduction at the lowest costs by means of tradi- 
tional methods, as well as a system of trading in emission permits. 
The direct aim consisted in making companies of public utility (power 
plants) select morę a cost-effective manner of emissions reduction. The 
elements of the system were the following:
1. netting (facilitating trading between emitters inside one organiza- 
tional unit);
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2. offset - transactions drawn between various companies (cession of the 
saved surplus of emissions after liąuidation or modernization of in- 
stallations resulting in a decrease in emission);
3. bubbles - emission caps;
4. banking - depositing of rights.
The efficiency of the program was evaluated in a different way: 
some authors claim that it did not bring about a decrease in emissions, 
or if so only to an negligable degree [Klassen, 1994], others, on the other 
hand, judge that it improved the ąuality of the air due to [Tintenberg, 
1984]: facilitating the attainment of morę rigorous norms; encouraging 
depositing rights, which were not utilized; providing a financial “pre- 
mium” in return for the reduction of emissions.
The effectiveness of the program may be evaluated positively, al- 
though the cost savings did not concern all the forms of the program in 
an equal way:
- Netting and bubbles allowed saving administrative costs, as well as 
costs within the very firms (most of the savings were attained on net­
ting transactions and their source was, among others, the fact that the 
reąuirement of reviewing subjects did not exist);
- Offset transactions brought about certain savings, which however 
were not assessed;
- Banking yielded little saving, mainly due to a smali number of trans­
actions.
Problems of implementation stemmed chiefly from bureaucratic 
impediments created by the administrative authorities (a relatively long 
period of preparations for starting the program, and frequent changes 
resulting from it, a long period of awaiting the acceptance of a transac- 
tion), and also from relatively high transaction costs referring to trading 
between firms.
An attempt at implementing this solution was undertaken in the 
Netherlands. In 1990, the national government of this country and the 
12 administrative districts signed a sector agreement with the union of 
producers of electrical energy (SEP) and with four non-associated ones. 
The agreement concerned reduction in SO2 emissions (up to 18 tons by 
the year 2000) and NOX (to the amount of 30 tons in the same year). The 
method of solution assumes implementation, by SEP, of a global (for all 
units) bubble, with the assumption that:
- the current emission norms will be binding for the existing power plants;
- morę rigorous norms of emission, determined on the basis of agree­
ment, will be binding for newly established power plants.
It is estimated that in comparison with implementing stricter, but 
standardized emission levels, the saving on costs will amount to 50%.
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A similar solution was applied in reference to refineries. The agreement 
drawn between the Ministry of Environment and refineries assumed de- 
creasing the overall emission from this sector by 36 tons annually.
In order to achieve this level of reduction it was assumed that a limit 
of 1000 mg SO2/m3 of waste gases should be. The limit referred to the 
ąuantity of raw materials and to the process of emission from particular 
refineries. This meant that if the individual limit of emission was met, 
certain emitters within each refinery could exceed it and others - might 
not come up to it. Increasing the amounts of oil processed in refineries 
reąuires raising that average standard, sińce otherwise, it would not be 
possible to achieve the assumed limit of annual emission. That hap- 
pened in 1993 and it was imperative that the average standard be de- 
creased from 1000 to 800 mg.
The method based on the concept of an individual bubble for refineries 
may be called the method of averaging emissions within individual com- 
panies.
The ecological effectiveness of this solution can hardly be evaluated 
explicitly. With a rise in oil processing it is possible to maintain the 
emission level of 1980, but, simultaneously, a drop in the average emis­
sion standard occurs. However, there exists an awareness that emissions 
can be brought below that limit. From the administrative point of view, 
the system seems easy to apply (issuing a uniform standard for refine­
ries). Conseąuently, the administrative costs of the system may be Iow 
and refineries may obtain considerable saving.
In 1984, Denmark also accepted a legał regulation, which, with refer­
ence to SO2 emission from power plants, imposed a limit on the emis­
sions to a maximum of 125 thousand tons in 1995. In 1987 it was as­
sumed that in the year 2005 this would be 85 thousand tons. In June 
1993 the limits were reduced (116 thousand tons in 1995 and 73 thou­
sand tons in 2000).
The method of trading is founded on the concept of a national bubble 
for power plants. The basis of the solution rests on establishing emission 
quota.
Annually, the Minister of Environment fixes the emission quota for 
the following eight years on the basis of plans sent in by energy produ- 
cers. In this system two groups of producers (companies) participate. 
The quota for the first four years is determined in reference to particular 
years, it is acceptable to exceed the annual limit by 10% provided that 
the cumulative top levels for a four-year period are not exceeded. Since 
that may concern both companies, the decision on the assignment of the 
annual limit of excess is left to them. They may transfer the emission re- 
ductions between each other.
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It is an important element of the system that while establishing the 
emission quota, imports of electrical energy are also taken into account. 
Net import of energy should lead to decreasing the emission quota for 
Danish companies. A rise in the net export of energy cannot lead to 
a rise in the quota, because this would stand in opposite to the directive 
concerning large objects of energetic combustion.
The system may be assessed to be effective at attaining ecological 
goals as it encouraged companies to apply differentiated technical me- 
thods of reduction of emissions. During the first years the companies 
lowered emissions to 10% below the fixed quota. Unfortunately, cost sa- 
ving was not assessed. Due to the existence of a “soft budget constraint” 
in the case of Danish electrical power engineering, it is difficult to explic- 
itly assess the efficiency (costs saving) on the national scalę. In compari- 
son with emission standards, the system does not seem easier on the in- 
stitutional-administrative side.
On the other hand, in Germany, the basis of the offset system depends 
on two binding rules inn the law on environmental protection: the clause 
of restoration and principle of compensation. They allow for executing 
offset transactions. The clause of restoration is applicable to the con- 
struction of new power plants in an area where standards of air quality 
are not observed. This clause does not allow constructing plants, even 
though they might satisfy emission standards. However, according to 
technical executive regulations of 1974, they could be established on con- 
dition they replaced installations of the same kind and also when the 
new installation did not belong to the same company owning the ones al- 
ready existing in the area.
In the regulations modified in 1983 it was accepted that a restoration 
of the existing installations should give rise to the implementation of off­
set Solutions. Transactions of this sort might be applied, if they led to 
a reduction in the average annual concentration in the area and also 
when the new installation met emission standards.
The principle of compensation was introduced in 1986 as a result of 
technical executive regulations. According to the latter, the existing in­
stallations were to be modernized, in order to satisfy morę rigorous emis­
sion standards, usually over a five-year period. The period of improving 
air quality could be extended to eight years, if the undertakings aimed 
at the reduction of emissions in the existing installations should secure 
a greater global reduction in comparison with the one possible in conse- 
quence of applying reductions in each company separately. Compensa­
tion could be only applied in reference to the installations working in the 
same geographical area and also for the same pollutants (or ones of com-
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parable impact). Thus, the principle of compensation may be applied, fol- 
lowing a prior reduction of emissions.
From the point of view of ecological effectiveness both Solutions (the 
clause and the principle) are evaluated as positive and neutral. It is esti- 
mated that cost savings obtained as a result of application of the principle 
of compensation was smali. There is a lack of data to evaluate the admi- 
nistrative reąuirements. The clause of restoration is limited because: 
- the marginal influence of an installation on the concentration in an 
area is lower than 1%;
- marginal emissions are covered by “offset” in the same area;
- it assumes starting a new installation following an improvement in 
the existing ones.
Moreover, new installations cannot be used, if this led to exceeding 
the norms of air ąuality in the given area.
The principle of compensation was madę use of in 50 out of 1,700 
cases satisfying initial conditions. This resulted from important limita- 
tions: a one-year period for the acceptance of restoration plans and the 
smali dimensions of the area where offset could be applied. The fact that 
reąuirements related to the global reduction in emissions are stricter in 
comparison with reduction achieved by means of emission norms seems 
to matter considerably. Furthermore, in the case where a new firm 
would like to dispose of morę than one pollutant, there is a necessity of 
a number of offset exchanges.
3. Solutions designed in Poland
The so-called “Chorzów experiment” was a good example of introdu- 
cing a local bubble [Elaboration on the methodology..., 1996]. This solu- 
tion was implemented in practice. Within the experiment, the option of 
tradable rights of SO2 emissions for stationary sources of combustion 
was also taken into account. It was considered as an element of an inte- 
grated strategy of air protection and included elements of a program of 
fixed deposits (banking) and trading in the rights of emissions for sta­
tionary sources [Ibid., p. 117] Another solution, based on a concept of 
a regional bubble, was the so-called Opole pilot implementation pro- 
gramme for SO2 emission tradable permits in the energy sector (power 
plants and heating works).
The system of tradable rights was to replace the administrative-legal 
one of environmental protection existing in Poland. The object was to 
propose a mechanism, which could secure, in a morę effective way, the 
achievement of the aims of state ecological policy.
206 BOGUSŁAW FIEDOR, ANDRZEJ GRACZYK AND ZBIGNIEW JAKUBCZYK
The point of reference for the activities connected with SO2 emission 
reduction is madę by the reąuirements imposed by the norms in the ordi- 
nance issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Re­
sources and Forestry (MOŚZNiL) of 1990. Both projects underlined that 
together with the implementation of a system of tradable emission 
rights, the emission norms imposed on sources of fuel combustion for 
power engineering should be replaced by a complex program of limiting 
SO2 emissions from all the sources of the pollutant, including technologi- 
cal ones. It is vital, however, that the proposed system should reąuire 
“stiffening and a morę rigorous execution of both realizing programs of 
limiting emissions and imposed duties and principles” [A Project of 
a System..., p. 5, 1995].
Implementation of the policy of limiting air pollution needs the cre- 
ation of a countrywide and regional program of pollution reduction. The 
National Program for Reduction of Emissions is a many-year program 
(lasting at least ten years) aimed at decreasing the emissions of selected 
polluting substances and determines, as agreed with a given Voivod, the 
level of reduction for each Voivodship (Region). On the other hand, the 
regional program specifies in detail the national program of reduction of 
emissions. According to it, they are directions of alterations in emission 
levels which are determined, but not aims.
The basie element of the system is a differentiation of pollution 
sources in the area with regard to their burden on the environment, as 
well as determining the measure of the burden. The index of noxious- 
ness is the measure of emitter noxiousness determined for the given pol­
luting substance, which takes into account the physical parameters of 
the emitter such as:
- its localization and the rangę of activity,
- current level of pollutant emission,
- concentration in the air,
- sensitivity of the surroundings to this substance.
The class of noxiousness is madę by a set of emitters having a similar 
influence on emissions into the environment. Inclusion of the emitter 
into a given class is done on the basis of the index of noxiousness.
Each class of noxiousness has an exchange index ascribed to it. The 
exchange index is an integer assigned to a class, which assesses the mu- 
tual influence of emitters belonging to various classes of noxiousness to 
the environment.
This method, called “a method of indexes of exchange”, is based on the 
circulation of an equivalent charge instead of real emission. It is calculated 
as the product of the given amount of the real charge and the exchange in- 
dex. In order to purchase the necessary amount of rights, it is necessary to
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purchase such an amount of the equivalent charge to be received. The de- 
manded amount of rights expressed in the real charge (the mass of pollu- 
ting substance emitted into the air is calculated as a result of the charge by 
its own exchange index [A Project of a System..., 1995, p. 9],
An the effect of the transaction is a reduction in emissions. A high ex- 
change index for the most burdensome units encourages the reduction of 
emissions (one can then have a greater number of units of the equivalent 
charge at disposal to transfer further). The purchasers, if only they pos- 
sess a lower exchange index, obtain, eventually, the possibility of in- 
creasing emissions according to the real charge. A reduction in the real 
level of emissions is thus uncertain, sińce the most burdensome units 
are offered the most encouragement to reduce emissions.
The system includes, however, two kinds of protection against exces- 
sive purchase of the rights:
- emission levels determined in emission norms must not be exceeded;
- the amount of pollution emitted into the air cannot be exceeded before 
entering the system of tradable emission rights; the amount is deter­
mined in the so-called ‘Initial charge’.
Any legał of civil subject may be participants in trading. However, avail- 
ing oneself of purchasing rights requires satisfying certain conditions: 
- possessing a decision on permissible emission into the air, 
- being granted an individual index of noxiousness,
- obtaining a starting decision on emissions which determines: the ini­
tial charge, the amount of assigned (free of charge) tradable rights of 
emission for particular years (according to the regional program of re­
duction), the exchange index and also permissible emission (kg/h) for 
each work alternative, as well as the rights and obligations of the sub­
ject within the system.
In the system, there exists only one type of rights which are subject to 
transactions. Tradable rights are expressed as units of a real charge on 
the polluting substance. In the year for which they are issued, they allow 
the emission of a given amount of pollutants into the air. In the case the 
rights are not used in that year, they may be deposited for the following 
ones. The rights are granted for 10 years, nevertheless the leveł of pollu­
tion permitted decreases (or remains stable) with each year, depending 
on the regional plan of reduction of emissions.
The initial assignment of the rights is one of the major problems. At 
the moment of launching the system, the existing units are granted the 
rights on a free of charge basis. They are distributed to particular emit- 
ters according to their emission needs (as the mean of annual charges of 
pollutants emitted into the atmosphere during the whole period of acti- 
vity, however not longer than the last three years prior to the unit being
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included into the system). These rights are assigned for individual years 
over a period of ten consecutive years.
However, the assignment of the rights varies in dependence on the 
fact of a subject being included into the system realizing investments 
serving the purpose of reducing emissions. These units, which will com- 
plete the realization of the investments after implementation of the act 
determining the principles behind the system of tradable rights of emis- 
sion, may count on being granted a set of rights that corresponds in its 
scope to the emission needs of the last three years before completion of 
the emission limiting investments [A Project of a System..., 1995, p. 14],
The System of Emissions Filing is a solution proposed in the Opole 
project, which is meant to facilitate the control of emission in a year. 
This solution “may partially replace installations of continuous measure- 
ments of emissions” [Ibid., p. 28]. This system possesses the form of the 
Certified Company Bank of Emissions and the certification is based on 
the currently existing system of controlling documentation submitted by 
organizational units with the aim of issuing them a decision on the per- 
missible level of emission. Such control is to consist of determining the 
appropriateness of characteristic amounts deposited into the bank of va- 
lues, as well as checking if technological conditions correspond to those 
specified in the relevant administrative decision.
The system of tradable rights is eąuipped with a mechanism which 
makes a departure from the established rules unprofitable. A subject 
that, in any given year, emits morę pollutants than allowed by its rights 
is liable to punishment. The severity of the latter is ten times the mar­
ket price of the additional amount of rights which the subject would 
have to possess. On the other hand, a subject that emits morę than is 
permitted from the starting charge is liable to a punishment eąual to the 
price twenty times greater than the one of the equivalent charge on the 
surplus emissions resulting from the starting charge. In the case that 
the reąuirements established by the decision on permissible emissions 
are not met, the subject is punishable by sanctions identical to those ap- 
plied in the present system, preserving the right to suspension if invest- 
ments directed at eliminating the causes of imposition of the punish­
ment are duły implemented [Ibid., p. 27].
Charges for emitting pollutants into the air are sustained. The system 
assumes the possibility of resignation from collecting, charges which re- 
sult from the emission of polluting substances into the air, which should 
not occur prior to a positive evaluation of its implementation and which 
should encompass all the organizational units operating in the area co- 
vered by the system [Designing the System..., 1996].
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The system designed was not implemented as a pilot one (as it was in- 
tended by the ordering side) due to the lack of Instruments reąuired to 
carry it out at a time of changes being introduced into the legał system. 
The pilot implementation was changed into a simulation scheme.
Assessing the effectiveness, one can point to some conclusions follow- 
ing from the simulations carried out:
1. The use of the exchange index stimulates emission distribution in the 
right direction; the charge was reduced by emitters of high maximum 
exchange indexes, whereas purchasers were non-noxious emitters;
2. The mean annual costs of reduction were decisively the highest under 
the command-and-control approach, while in the “market” one they 
were slightly lower than the ones in the auction approach;
3. The mean annual costs of reduction were lower in the “index-free” ap­
proach (both for the market and auction variants);
4. The assumed level of SO2 reduction was not achieved in all the ap- 
proaches:
- With an assumed reduction of 51%, the command-and-control ap­
proach secured a 52% reduction, and the remaining ones 53-58% 
(the highest for the auction one without the index),
- With an assumed reduction of 75%, the command-and-control ap­
proach secured a 83% reduction, the market one - 69% (variant 
without the index) or 72% (the one with the index), while the “auc­
tion” approach secured, in both variants, an 83% reduction of emis- 
sions;
5. The mean and maximum concentrations of SO2 in the area of influ­
ence at a 51% reduction were at the same level as in the com- 
mand-and-control approach and the one without the index, whereas 
they were lower in the one with the index; at a 75% reduction, the 
command-and-control approach yields the highest concentration le- 
vels, while under the other two approaches - levels remain close to 
each other.
On the basis of the simulations carried out as part of the Opole Project 
and concerning the functioning of the market, certain conclusions can be 
drawn for the project for a permit system:
1. Taking into account the reduction in costs, the best solution seems to 
be the market system, with the reservation, however, that this solu­
tion may prove not fully effective when assuming a high degree of re­
duction (however it is sufficient for reduction of 50%).
2. The differences in expenditures for individual variants amount to 
approx. 20%.
3. The higher the emission reduction, the smaller the differences be- 
tween expenditures according to different variants of this scheme.
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4. Applying the principle of authorisation auction rises the reduction 
costs, but in the case of the highest assumed degree of reduction, the 
effectiveness is higher than the assumed one.
5. Applying exchange indicators increases the reduction costs, but does 
not bring significant differences concerning the degree of reduction.
6. The stricter the reduction program is, the smaller the differences in 
the finał ecological effect among the individual variants of the system 
[Designing the system..., 1996, p. 44].
5. Cap and Trade - modification
of the American system
According to the Cap and Trade system discussed, every emission 
source has to fulfil two reąuirements. The first and somehow basie one is 
the permit [non-assignable emission limit], which is considered as indi- 
vidual permission. This permit may be expressed in physical terms (e.g. 
in tons of defined substance), as a part of the global emission or as an 
environment load per production unit.
Permit distribution is mostly politically conditioned [Comp. Imple- 
menting an emission..., 1997, p. 26]. Environmental damages caused by 
acid rains because of SO2 emission, are considered to be scientifically 
proven. This was a generał foundation for the establishment of the pro­
gram for reduction in annual domestic emission. Emissions were shared 
amongst particular subjects in the energetic sector. At the same time, 
this program joined the program for global emission reduction.
The above solution allowed the environmental administration to morę 
efficiently reduce global emission than it was possible while using the 
traditional system of trade. Using the second solution, the administra­
tion could reduce the main emissions during commercial transactions, 
employing a suitable offset ratio, as to the permits, the annual correc- 
tions were possible.
Apart from the permit, each participant has an emission permit con­
sidered morę restrictive than a non-assignable limit [Żylicz, 1999, 
p. 156], which may be the subject of the free trade. The emission source 
may purchase a considerable number of transferable rights, however it 
cannot receive permission for the actual emission, until it fulfils the 
non-assignable emission conditions.
Non-assignable permit and assignable permissions are treated as 
a formal system of pressure [Ibid.]. This resulted in the departure from 
the idea applied before, namely: emission reduction credits. This first so­
lution consisted of using environmental banks, also known as the banks
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of issue. Not all the surplus pollution reductions, but only a specific part 
of them were subject of the trade. This is determined together with the 
validity period by the local EPA agenda. Emission reduction credits con- 
stitute an economic equivalent of the surplus reduction, excluding the 
fact that most of the reduction credits must always be lower than the 
achieved physical reductions, which is a condition for entering them in 
the books [Czaja, Fiedor, Jakubczyk, 1997, p. 75]
From the point of view of the polluting party, the distinction between 
limit and right to emission may be treated as an additional complication. 
However, there are also specific benefits of this system.
Firstly, environmental administration is released from examining the 
generał effect of particular transactions, because there are legał and admi- 
nistrative limitations preventing high emission in specified micro-regions.
Moreover, in the system of double permission not only the potential 
polluting party may purchase the right to emission, as potential demand 
comes from government and non-government organisations and even in- 
dividual citizens as well [Żylicz, 1999, p. 157]. This solution was not 
present in the previous system, where it was possible to fully trade the 
emission, although as far as coherence is concerned there were no seri- 
ous obstacles for the participation of the subjects mentioned above.
Even though, broadening the circle of potential purchasers is con- 
nected with the system of double permissions. They have to be treated 
morę like a type of “social” completion of this system. Leaving the part of 
the rights to emission in the state of “dormancy”, additional subjects ex- 
press their preferences concerning the ąuality of atmospheric air. Such 
acting activates the demand part of the market and helps to keep prices 
at an appropriate level. However, it has to be remembered that addi­
tional subjects purchasing rights to emission cannot use them in broadly 
understood economic purposes and this “dormancy” is the only form of 
possession.
In 1990 the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) allowed the implemen- 
tation of the Acid Rains Program in the USA. The idea of this program was 
a reduction in the emission of the gases causing these rains Corning from 
the electro-energetic sector by 10 Mt (or by 50%) [Ellerman, 1998, p. 6].
The implementation of the program was divided into two stages:
During the first stage (1995-1999) the indirect SO2 emission limit 
was distributed among 263 power units. These units, having a global 
power of 88 GW, belonged to 110 power plants owned by 61 economic 
subjects. This group was administratively appointed, as it comprises 
units whose emission exceeds 2,5 kg of sulphur dioxide per tonne of Bri- 
tish Theoretical Standard Fuel (BTSF) and which may be numbered 
among middle-sized units (over 100 MW).
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During the second stage which began in 2000, all power units heated 
by solid fuels are being incorporated into the program for limiting the 
annual emission of SO2 to 9 Mt by the year 2010.
The Acid Rains Program assumes that the limitation of sulphur diox- 
ide emission will be a continuous process. As a result, year by year the 
level of allowed limits for individual units has decreased. During the pe­
riod of 1995-1999 the limit for the 263 participants dropped from 7,1 Mt 
down to 6 Mt.
During the second stage, concerned with incorporating new subjects to 
the project, the annual nation-wide limit was raised up to 9,48 Mt.
Emission limitation is the most important among several crucial is- 
sues of the project. The geographical rangę and subject of the trade were 
expanded. This is presented Table 1.
Table 1. Crucial issues
Emission Targets Decrease in the annual emission from electro-energetic sector by 50%
Geographical Rangę The whole area of the USA
Subject of the trade Permission for SO2 emission.
Source: Tradable permits for air pollution control: the US experience. In: Imple- 
menting domestic tradable permits for enuironmental protection. OECD 1999, p. 34.
No geographical or time limitations were approved. The permissions 
may be stored in the form of a specific safe-deposit for futurę use. The 
original version of the project suggested forming trade sub-regions.
Among the subjects authorised to pilot transactions the following have 
been distinguished: Power plants, brokers, fuel suppliers and other 
groups. Some of the suppliers of strongly sulphurous coal, began, as 
a part of trade permissions, the process of reducing the pollution level, 
which in the light of the whole program should increase the demand for 
their coal.
The institutions concerned with trade should have access to Informa­
tion about prices, especially during the first stage of the program. These 
sources include information about earlier transactions, systematic bro­
kers’ reports and the list of prices from EPA auctions.
As to the enforcement of the law, the system worked on an annual ba- 
sis. If a given individual sold the rights to emission, but did not perform 
the necessary reduction, he was charged with financial and administra- 
tive sanctions. The financial penalty amounts to $2500 for every tonne 
over the acceptable limit, the administrative penalty meant decreasing 
the limit for the next year by the number of tonnes over the acceptable
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limit. This penalty level followed from the initial price simulation which 
was predicted to be $300-800 per tonne. The penalty was to be at least 
triple the worth of the transaction unit.
As far as the reinforcement of participation in the system is con- 
cerned, the solution applied allows the subjects to participate volun- 
tarily. However, they will be obliged to participate in the 2nd phase and 
transactions of the lst phase. As a result, the systematic growth of the 
number of this type of subjects has been observed.
The SO2 trade program has gone trough a process of far reaching evo- 
lution. The transaction volume growing in time was a significant consti- 
tuent of the permit surplus. Initially, the number of transactions madę 
directly between power-plants and between brokers and entrepreneurs 
was similar. With time, the number of transactions madę by brokers 
grew to be five times as great at the number of direct transactions. Not 
all transactions were connected with the costs reduction strategy, sińce 
20% is madę up by broker-broker transactions, and 40% power-plant- 
-broker transactions. Another significant group was constituted by fu­
tur es type transactions (8-year long).
Table 2. The size of the permission trade in years 1994—1997
Year



















1994 215 9.2 66 0.9 149 8.3 0.18
1995 613 16.7 329 1.9 248 14.8 0.18
1996 1 074 8.2 578 4.4 496 3.8 0.28
1997 1 429 15.2 810 7.9 619 7.3 0.30
* Transactions between the economic subjects as: power-plants, brokers and fuel suppliers.
** Transactions between subjects, both between individual units, as well as global subject emission 
units (the latter case relates to technological changes resulting from the fact that several emitters, i.e. 
stacks, come to be replaced with a single one).
Source: Tradable... desery, cit. p. 36.
In spite of such a great number of transactions, their ąuantity was 
smaller than that expected from the simulations [Molburg, 1991], The 
biggest surprise, however, was the level of the transaction prices, which 
year after year systematically fell.
To a certain extent, this was connected with a lower than expected 
cost level of pollution reduction. The analysis madę by EPA showed the 
high variability of the costs mentioned above, which undoubtedly to
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a significant degree limits the accuracy on average measures (see the ta- 
ble above). However, it shows the trend of prices.
The price level can be examined even morę precisely, by studying the 
extreme cost curve, which was drawn for the period from 1990-1995 
with fixed prices from the year 1995. It shows that a reduction of up to 
3,5 Mt of SO2 can be achieved with a cost of $200 per ton.
Table 3. The anticipated and real level of trading prices of emission permits
Year The trading price of permists ($/ton)









* Anticipated price level.
Source: Bohi and Buthraw, 1997, p. 10.
Table 4. Cost shaping depending on the reduction level in the USA companies analysed
Reduction method Reduction in Fixed Variable Total Averagethou. of tons costs* costs* costs* costs $/ton
Desulphurisation 1 754 375,0 89,3 464,4 265
Fuel change 1 709 57,2 204,1 261,3 153
The cost of both 
methods 3 462 432,2 293,5 725,7 210
Cost-free methods* 425 0 0 0 0
Global ąuantities 3 888 432,2 293,5 725,7 187
* costs in millions of dollars
** cost-free methods describe the situation when the fuel change to a less sulphurous fuel was eon- 
nected with its lower market price.
Source: Ellerman et al., 1998.
5. Comparative analysis of the Opole Project 
with Cap and Trade
To do such an analysis of the PHARE pilot project (in this paper also 
called the Opole Project) and the American Cap and Trade Project
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(double allowance), the most important features of the two of them are 
juxtaposed with each other according to eight characteristic criteria. (see 
Table 5).
With respect to geographical limitations, the Opole Project may be 
considered universal, having application in both local and nation-wide 
dimensions. In turn, Cap and Trade Project is strictly nation-wide. This 
is because in the US local projects are simultaneously carried out incor- 
porating individual States, as well as regions chosen geographically or 
ecologically as a part of Solutions started in the late 1970s.
In both the projects discussed the current legał system was examined 
separately. The Opole Project assumed the possibility of incorporating 
emission trading into the current legał system, and above all to the regu- 
lations in force concerning current emission. The American Project pro- 
posed total resignation from the less and less efficiently working and 
very expensive CAC system. Although in the Polish case certain changes 
in the legał regulations concerning environmental protection would be 
essential, far reaching legislative inertia was implicitly assumed. In the 
case of the US, there was a political will to combine global emission re- 
duction with the marketing of the atmospheric air protection system.
Within the rangę of making the inalienable authorisations in both cases 
the same solution was applied. The difference was in the way of its execu- 
tion. The Opole Project was willing to stay in conformity with the cur- 
rently existing system of granting allowable emission decisions for purely 
pragmatic purposes. In the US there was a fear that unrestricted trade 
would excessively concentrate emissions in selected regions of the coun­
try. This is because all geographical and time restrictions were rejected.
Different methodology was definitely applied when describing the to­
tal emission rangę. Methodologically, the Opole System was based on 
grandfathering, which was seen in every solution. The initial ration of 
emission rights (carried out by means of distribution of the so-called 
emission tokens) would be equal to previous emission level. Further- 
more, the global emission ąuantity would be limited according to the cur­
rent emission reduction program.
The American solution assumed that all larger power units (over 
100 MW) may not satisfy the norm of branch emission which is 2,5kg 
SO2 from 1 BPU ton. Then, similarly to Poland, it assumed a successive 
reduction of the global emission level.
Comparing the two Solutions, the advantage of the American concept 
has to be pointed out. To a certain extent it rewards those economic sub- 
jects, which earlier madę protective [safeguarding] investments. At the 
start these already have serious surpluses of emission rights above their 
current level. In contrast, the Opole Projecfs subjects having highly
Table 5. Characteristic features of the Opole Project and Cap and Trade
Characteristic feature Opole Project Cap and Trade Project
Projecfs geographical 
dimension
Local and regional The whole country
Project’s sector di­
mension
Broadly understood electro-energetic sector (all 
subjects emitting SO2 as a result of burning 
fuel)
Subjects of the electro-energetic sector
Cohesion with the 
current legał system
Incorporated into the current legał system It is a new solution in comparison to the existing sys­
tem (at the time of planned introduction)
Establishing off-mar- 
ket emission permits
There is a fixed emission permit resułting from 
the permission applying to the acceptable level 
of emissions
There is a fixed emission permit which is to prevent 
excessive concentration of emissions in selected regions
Establishing global 
emission permit
Established global emission permit will be re- 
duced according to the national and provincial 
emission reduction program
Established global emission permit reduction according 
to the norm assuming the 2,5 kg SO2 per BPU ton 
limit is not exceeded
Limiting the number 
of the trade partici- 
pants
The system participants and the trade partici- 
pants were distinguished. Only the first group 
is limited. The system is directed towards all 
economic subjects.
During the first stage some of the subjects were incor­
porated into the system. The rest could participate vol- 
untarily. All emitters are obliged to take part in the 




The applied exchange ratę method is calculated 
as the product of the specific amount of actual 
load and the exchange ratę
Substitutive conversion units were applied to some 
subjects participating voluntarily in the system while 
receiving authorisation
Payment for received 
authorisation
Free of charge Free of charge
Duration of received 
authorisation

















Characteristic feature Opole Project Cap and Trade Project
The basis for receiv- 
ing primary emission
grandfathering Emission per BPU ton norm
The means of enforc- 
ing the law
Exceeding the emission permit results in a fi- 
nancial penalty amounting to ten times the 
authorisation price
A financial penalty ($2500) and administrative re- 
straints in proportion to the excess emissions
Time dimension of 
the system
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efficient protective investments were even punished. Installations of this 
type are expensive from the point of view of investment, and of cost use. 
Moreover, their high efficiency means that the subseąuent emission li- 
mitations may be carried out only on the condition of ąuickly increasing 
marginal costs of pollution reduction. So, the morę protective invest- 
ments that were madę by a given economic subject before the system 
came into force, the worse is its starting position.
Both systems were given legał and economical means to force the or- 
ganizational units to obey the norms in force. The Opole Project limited 
itself to financial sanctions, which are calculated accordingly to the ex- 
isting system of ecological penalties. The American System had in addi- 
tion administrative sanctions in the form of limiting the number of pos- 
sessed permits in the following year.
Both systems allowed the possibility of depositing currently superflu- 
ous emission rights. The Opole Project suggests decreasing the number 
of deposited permits by 20% per year. The Cap and Trade system pre- 
ferred doing futures transactions.
Comparing the two Solutions, the advantage of the American concept 
has to be pointed out. It is mostly connected with the fact that it was put 
into motion which gave the possibility to constantly eliminate the short- 
comings. The Opole Project did not have this advantage and it did not 
reach the actual implementation stage.
6. External legał conditions
In the analysis of the external conditions, we focus only on those 
which bring Poland strictly defined, also as regards time, legał conse- 
ąuences, which means the necessity of transposition some regulations 
into Polish law or of realizing ecological aims, defined in International 
ecological agreements signed and ratified by Poland. Such an interpreta- 
tion suggests that the most important legał and institutional external 
conditions of a market of SO2 emission rights in the electro-energetic 
sector are:
- Directive 88/609/EEC together with the subseąuent accompanying 
regulations (Directive 90/656/EEC and Directive 94/66/EC);
- EU directive concerning integrated prevention and limitation of pollu­
tion (IPPC) 96/62/ECC;
- 2nd Sulphur Protocol.
In generał, it can be said that from the point of view of the projected 
SO2 emission market for the electro-energetic sector, the results of Di- 
rective 88/609/EEC are analogous to those resulting from the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection’s decrees from 12 February 1990 and 8 Sep-
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tember 1998.1 However, a morę generał problem arises, whether during 
preliminary negotiations with the EU Poland should try to consider the 
electro-energetic sector as the single SO2 emitter. for which the residual 
emission ąuantity responds to the standards from the discussed Direc- 
tive. This would mean that certain power-plants or electro-energetic 
units could at least for some time not meet those standards, but emis­
sion from the whole energetic branch would fit into the framework of the 
hypothetical emission resulting from them. A simple justification for 
such an option is that from the point of international SO2 pollution from 
the Polish electro-energetic industry, including influence on EU coun- 
tries (the exportation of emission from a Polish perspective, but import- 
ing from the EU perspective), localisation of the emission does not have 
any significance. On the other hand, accepting this option would mean 
a considerable widening of the potential trade rangę.
1 In the above analysis we omit these decrees which are of rather supplementary kind 
in comparison to the Decree from 8 September. These are: the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection’ decree from 18 September 1998 concerning the detailed regulations of fixing 
acceptable types and quantities of polluting substances, that can be introduced into the 
atmosphere and reąuirements concerning the preparation of documents essential for issu- 
ing the decision fixing the types and ąuantities of polluting substances allowed to be in­
troduced into the atmosphere (DzU No 124, item 819); the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection’ decree from 3 September 1998 concerning the methods of calculating the State 
of air pollution for existing and designed sources (DzU No 122, item 805) and the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection’ decree from 28 April 1998 concerning acceptable concentra- 
tions of polluting substances in the air (DzU No 55, item 355).
Obviously, as we have pointed out while discussing the conseąuences 
of the decree from 8 September 1998, in order to purchase the rights to 
emission (for a given emitter), the given subject has to meet reąuire- 
ments resulting from an Individual Reduction Plan, ensuing, in turn, 
from the National reduction Plan.
It is also worth remembering that the harmonisation of Polish ecologi- 
cal law with EU law Solutions may not rely only on the transposition of 
the specific legał and formal Solutions into the Polish legał system, but 
above all on accepting the commitment to realising the aims of the EU in 
the realm of environmental protection, as these are specified in appro- 
priate ordinances and directives. This way, according to Directive 
88/609/EEC, the recommended average level of SO2 reduction for exist- 
ing power-plants should, on the nation-wide scalę in relation to SO2 
emissions in the year 1980 amount to:
- 20% until year 1993;
- 42% until year 1998;
- 57% until year 2003.
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Taking into consideration that the electro-energetic sector’s share in 
overall nation-wide emission amounts to approx. 50%, this gives the fol- 
lowing annual total emission quantities in this sector:
- 1541 thou. tons by the year 1993;
- 1117 thou. tons by the year 1998;
- 828 thou. tons of SO2 by the year 2003 [Kudełko, p. 42, 2000].
Because in the market of transferable emission rights of SO2 by elec­
tro-energetic subjects only some of them would take part (smali power 
units should be excluded because of their strong, at least potentially, 
negative influence on the air ąuality), the total ąuantity of emission con- 
stituting the basis for the National Emission Reduction Plan would be 
respectively smaller. Assuming that the participation of these subjecfs 
emission amounts to 90%, by the year 2003 the level would reach 
745 thou. tons.
The above reasoning directly refers to Poland’s obligations resulting 
from the ratification of the 2nd Sulphuric Protocol. It characterises the 
maximum level of SO2 emission for Poland in individual years until the 
year 2020.
Similarly, the quantities resulting from the reduction scalę described in 
Directive 88/609/EEC should constitute the generał basis for a National 
SO2 Emission Reduction Plan, as well as for the plant programs, concern- 
ing both those participating and not participating in the market concerned.
Table 6. Limits to SO2 emission for the commercial* power industry according to the 2nd 
Sulphuric Protocol (thou. tons)
Year 2000 2005 2010
Poland, 2 583 2 173 1 397
Including the power 
industry 1 292 1 087 699
* The notion “commercial” means in this context that the production of electricity (and/or heat) for 
consumption of specific industrial plants possessing power units (e.g. Steel mills or copper works) is 
not included.
Source: Studium Rozwoju Podsystemu Wytwarzania Energii Elektrycznej w Polsce, 1994.
The IPPC Directive is a type of a framework regulation and in the fu­
turę it will replace many detailed ecological EU regulations, including 
those applying directly and indirectly to the electro-energetic industry. 
It has been binding for the new installations and plants sińce October 
1999, and will be binding from October 2007 for all economic subjects. 
From the point of the projected system of transferable authorisation, its 
two most important implications are:
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1. obligatory application of BAT or BATNEEC technologies;
2. obligatory obtaining the integrated ecological permission, in order to 
replace the previously existing individual permits for exploiting natu- 
ral resources and polluting the environment.
Polish environmental protection law so far lacks these regulations 
which impose application of BAT or BATNEEC technologies. Transposi- 
tion of the IPPC Directive into Polish law will have to introduce this 
duty. This could mean that all the power units from power-plants, and 
heat and power generating plants will have to apply technologies secu- 
ring the highest level of sulphur removal from exhaust gases, which 
means the best technologies of wet desulphurisation. This would imply 
a significant flattening of the emission reduction costs which would lead 
to lower interest in emission trade. Diversity of the reduction costs 
would be in such circumstances caused mainly by the difference in size 
of the power units and so this would be the basie factor which, with the 
common applications of BAT or BATNEEC technologies, would decide 
about the potential size of demand and supply of the transferable rights 
for SO2 emissions in the electro-energetic sector.
The futurę duty of economic subjects of obtaining integrated ecological 
permits resulting from the IPPC Directive, may cause significant compli- 
cations in the functioning of the market of transferable rights for pollu- 
tion emission. For morę effective evidence of these rights and control, 
whether the real emission fits within the framework described in the 
permits and in Plans for Emission Reduction in a given plant, it would 
be essential to have individual decisions about the acceptable level of 
SO2 emission. In the act concerning environmental protection discussed 
earlier and prepared within the PHARE project, it was accepted that 
these decisions expire when the appropriate body confirms obtaining the 
transferable rights to emission by a given subject. Moreover, according 
to a new Polish environmental law (which is to come in force very soon), 
it is assumed “installations obliged to have integrated environmental 
permission, may not participate in the program of transferable rights to 
emission”. If we connect this record with the literał interpretation of 
IPPC Directive, that from the year 1999 (October) all new installations 
and from the year 2007 all installations will be obliged to have inte­
grated permits. This means, according to the mentioned act, that no sub­
ject in the electro-energetic sector would be able to participate in the 
emission market.
In the most recent act concerning environmental protection [www. 
mos.gow.tytull3.htm] the notion of the best available technology accord- 
ingly with the IPPC directive (Art. 195-209) was transposed into Polish 
law. This is done by introducing categories of integrated ecological
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permits. The Minister is to define the notion of subjects, which will be 
obliged to obtain such a permit. In comparison to the way of putting the 
above directive into practice, it may be supposed that in the futurę it will 
also include large subjects of the electro-energetic sector and so the po- 
tential participants of the market of transferable permits. On the other 
hand, the prepared act talks about the necessity of obtaining permits for 
releasing gases or dusts into the air. The idea of integrated permits, the- 
oretically speaking, excludes a situation when a given subject would 
have to obtain both permits. However, the discussed project of the act 
does not give a clear-cut solution to this problem. This may give rise to 
some legał (and formal) threat to the performance of the emission rights 
market, especially in the context of the necessity of having individual 
(for every installation emitting SO2 or other gases or dusts) decisions re- 
garding the acceptable level of emission as the basis to specify the initial 
pool of emission rights. It seems that, regardless of the category of the 
integrated permits, for the proposed market to function effectively the 
participating subjects will have to have individual administrative deci­
sions with reference to the permissible level sulphur dioxide emission.
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